Two-sided Facility Location by Alijani, Reza et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
11
39
2v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
7 F
eb
 20
18
Two-sided Facility Location
REZA ALIJANI, Duke University
SIDDHARTHA BANERJEE, Cornell University
SREENIVAS GOLLAPUDI, Google Research
KOSTAS KOLLIAS, Google Research
KAMESH MUNAGALA, Duke University
Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Ama-
zon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Ly, and Upwork, where a central platform mediates economic transactions
between buyers and sellers. Motivated by these platforms, we formulate a set of facility location problems
that we term Two-sided Facility location. In our model, agents arrive at nodes in an underlying metric space,
where the metric distance between any buyer and seller captures the quality of the corresponding match.
e platform posts prices and wages at the nodes, and opens a set of facilities to route the agents to. e
agents at any facility are assumed to be matched. e platform ensures high match quality by imposing a
distance constraint between a node and the facilities it is routed to. It ensures high service availability by
ensuring flow to the facility is at least a pre-specified lower bound. Subject to these constraints, the goal of
the platform is to maximize the social surplus (or gains from trade) subject to weak budget balance, i.e., profit
being non-negative.
We present an approximation algorithm for this problem that yields a (1+ ϵ) approximation to surplus for
any constant ϵ > 0, while relaxing the match quality (i.e., maximum distance of any match) by a constant
factor. We use an LP rounding framework that easily extends to other objectives such as maximizing volume
of trade or profit.
We justify our models by considering a dynamic marketplace seing where agents arrive according to a
stochastic process and have finite patience (or deadlines) for being matched. We perform queueing analysis to
show that for policies that route agents to facilities and match them, ensuring a low abandonment probability
of agents reduces to ensuring sufficient flow arrives at each facility. Such an analysis also helps us posit facility
location variants that capture seings where the platform elicits deadlines truthfully by posting loeries over
different prices and wages for different deadlines.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online marketplaces have transformed the economic landscape of the modern world. Many
of today’s most important companies are platforms facilitating trade between agents: both for
goods (Amazon, eBay, Etsy), and increasingly, services: transportation (Ly, Uber); physical and
virtual work (Taskrabbit, Upwork); lodging (Airbnb); etc. ese platforms enable fine-grained
monitoring of participants, and greater control via pricing, terms of trade, recommendation and
directed search, etc. e challenge of harnessing this increase in data and control has led to a
growing literature in online marketplace design.
e basic algorithmic challenge facing a marketplace platform can be summarized as follows: it
must decide which buyer should match to which seller, at what time, and for what price and wage,
in order to maximize some desired objective. In a sense, this combines the challenges of online
bipartite matching, job scheduling, and pricing and mechanism design. In this paper, we build
towards a model that simultaneously addresses these three orthogonal challenges and tackles the
two-sided marketplace design problem in its full generality.
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1.1 High-Level Problem Formulation
Our motivating application is the design of a marketplace platform, and in particular, policies
for pricing both buyers and sellers, and scheduling feasible matches between them. In our seing,
buyers and sellers flow into nodes located in a metric space representing an underlying feature
space in which agents are embedded. e metric distance between a buyer and seller captures the
overall quality of thematch; For instance, in AirBnB, it represents some combination of geographic
distance from the desired location and quality of room; in UpWork, it can capture how well the
skill set of the consultant matches the task requirements; and so on. We assume the platform needs
to match buyers and sellers within a distance threshold specified as input.
In addition to their known embedding in the metric space, buyers have value for being served,
and sellers have costs for providing service; the platform knows the distribution of these values.
e platform needs to make two policy decisions: what prices/wages to set at each node, and how
to match the resulting flow of buyers and sellers. We consider a simple class of policies where
the platform opens a set of facilities in the metric space (or canonical features in the feature space)
and routes flow from demand/supply nodes to these facilities. e flow routed to any facility is
matched up. In effect, the platform maps agents’ features to some close-by canonical features and
matches up agents with the same features. We insist these facilities satisfy the following service
guarantees:
(1) ality of service guarantees: e flow assigned to a facility is from supply and demand
nodes within distance R. erefore, any matched demand/supply is within distance 2R.
(2) Service availability guarantees: In order for the flow at the facility to match up, each
facility needs to have flow balance of supply and demand routed there. Furthermore, if we
view facilities as canonical features/types that are used to compress the feature space of
buyers/sellers, then we want these features to be sufficiently representative. We therefore
insist these facilities are sufficiently thick, meaning there is a lower bound L on the flow
routed to each of them.
In Section 5, we present a more formal queueing-theoretic justification, showing that the above
constraints arise from natural stochastic matching policies for dynamically arriving atomic agents.
e goal of the platform is to (i) set prices/wages at each node in the metric space; (ii) open a
set of facilities; and (iii) route the resulting demand/supply flow to these facilities satisfying the
quality and service availability guarantees. e objective of the platform is to maximize the gains
from trade or social surplus, which is total value of buyers minus total cost of sellers, subject to
weak budget balance, meaning that the profit (the difference between total price charged to buyers
and total wage paid to sellers) is non-negative. Our same solution idea applies to other objectives,
such asmaximizing profit, ormaximizing the throughput or volume of trade subject to weak budget
balance. is leads to a class of optimization problems that we term Two-sided Facility Location.
1.2 Our Results
Our first main contribution in Sections 2–4 is to show an approximation algorithm for Two Sided
Facility Location. We present a new LP rounding framework that for any constant ϵ > 0, achieves
a (1 + ϵ) approximation to the social surplus objective (resp. throughput and profit objectives).
It relaxes the distance bound constraint by a factor of 4, while preserving the budget balance
constraint, as well as the flow balance and lower bound constraints at each facility. If we allow
a tiny additive error ∆ in the surplus objective, our algorithm requires solving O
(
n1/ϵ
ϵ
log nWmax
ϵ∆
)
LPs, where n is the number of nodes, andWmax is the maximum possible surplus.
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We show in Section 2.2 that the surplus objective is NP-Hard to approximate to a factor o(Lc )
for some constant c > 0, unless the distance bound is relaxed by at least a factor of 2.
Techniques. Our facility location variants mirror the profit earning facility location problem
in [Meyerson, 2001]. Just like that seing, we have lower bounds on demand served at each facil-
ity and an upper bound on how far the facility can be from an assigned demand. However, there
are key differences that preclude the application of existing techniques from lower-balanced fa-
cility location [Friggstad et al., 2016, Guha et al., 2000, Karger and Minkoff, 2000, Meyerson, 2001,
Svitkina, 2008]: First, the demand or supply at each node is a variable that can be adjusted using
pricing. is means the demand/supply can be zero at some “outlier” nodes, so that they do not
need to be served by any facility. Secondly, each facility needs to satisfy flow balance between
supply and demand, and finally, both surplus and profit involve differences, so the platform can
potentially lose money at some facilities, but recover it at others.
e above differences make formulating an LP relaxation tricky. Note that even in [Meyerson,
2001], the version with outliers and profits that can become negative has unbounded integrality
gap, because the optimal profit can be zero while the LP achieves positive profit. Unlike [Meyerson,
2001], since we can control demand/supply by pricing, we have greater flexibility in modifying
the LP variables. Despite this, the integrality gap of the straightforward LP formulation for our
problem is large, because there could be a facility that generates a bulk of the surplus, but has large
negative profit that is compensated by other facilities. (See Appendix A.1 for an example).
is brings up our main technical contributions: We first observe that if we focus on the LP
variables corresponding to facility i , we can scale these up or down by changing the fraction to
which this node is an outlier. is enables us to use techniques reminiscent of improved greedy
algorithms for budgeted coverage problems [Dean et al., 2008, Khuller et al., 1999]: In particular,
we strengthen the LP formulation via guessing a few of the facilities that are opened in the optimal
solution. Next, we use the guesses to develop a structural characterization for this stronger LP
based onmodifying variables for pairs of facilities. In effect this shows that there is some integrality
in the neighborhood of any partially open facility, which helps us consolidate these facilities while
preserving all constraints.
eueing-theoreticFoundations. Our secondmain contribution is to present queueing-theoretic
micro-foundations to our facility location problems. What makes the problems hard and techni-
cally interesting is the presence of the lower bound L on flow routed to each facility; if L = 0, the
problem is in fact polynomial time solvable! In Section 5, we show that the lower bound constraints
(along with flow balance) arise naturally from a dynamic marketplace seing. Here, atomic buy-
ers/sellers arrive according to Poisson processes, and have a private patience for being matched
before they abandon the system. In this context, service availability corresponds to joint pricing
and matching policies that have low abandonment rate. We perform queueing analysis to show
that for policies that route agents to close-by facilities and match them optimally there, ensur-
ing a low abandonment probability reduces to ensuring both flow balance and that sufficient flow
arrives at each facility. In effect, our static facility location variants have their roots in dynamic
control policies that maximize surplus while ensuring low abandonment.
e advantage of our LP rounding framework for Two-sided Facility Location is that it gracefully
handles more complex variants motivated by the dynamic marketplace seing. For instance, con-
sider the dynamic problem where the platform uses prices and wages to truthfully elicit patience
of agents, and subsequently matches them optimally using Earliest Deadline First (EDF) sched-
uling in each facility. Motivated by this, we consider an envy-free variant of Two-sided Facility
Location in Section 6, where each node (or agent type) is composed of sub-types that envy one
another. e platform sets prices/wages for each sub-type so that each agent truthfully chooses
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its sub-type. Each sub-type has a weight and the service availability constraints are captured by
flow balance of supply and demand at each facility, and a lower bound on the total weight routed
to each open facility. Our LP rounding framework easily extends to yield optimal profit while
relaxing the distance constraint by factor 4.
1.3 Related Work
Two-sided Markets. Our objective maximizes social surplus subject to budget balance (and in-
dividual rationality). is is a classic objective in two-sided market mechanisms, and originates
in the celebrated work of Myerson and Saerthwaite [Myerson and Saerthwaite, 1983], where it
is termed gains of trade. ey considered the case of a single buyer and seller. is has inspired
a recent line of work on truthful mechanisms for approximate surplus maximization in markets
of multiple buyers and sellers [Blumrosen and Mizrahi, 2016, Brustle et al., 2017, McAfee, 2008],
ultimately resulting in a 2-approximation to gains of trade. is line of work assumes buyers and
sellers are matched in one shot. e novelty in our work is in modeling a dynamic seing and
incorporating service availability guarantees while preserving the same objectives. We therefore
consider the more natural class of mechanisms that post prices and wages. Posted price mecha-
nisms have been extensively studied in two-sided marketplaces [Armstrong, 2006, McAfee, 2008,
Rochet and Tirole, 2003, Weyl, 2010], and the main idea we borrow from this literature is the no-
tion of insulating tariffs [Weyl, 2010], which posits that market design is easier if the prices seen
by buyers is disconnected from the wages seen by service providers.
Another recent line of work shows approximately optimal mechanisms for maximizing welfare
in two sided markets with goods [Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2016, Colini-Baldeschi et al., 2017]; how-
ever, theirs is a sum objective defined in terms of the final sets of items allocated to each buyer
and seller, which is different from the gains of trade.
Finally, our work is related to two-sided segmentation problems considered in [Banerjee et al.,
2017]. In their model, prices appear endogenously via market clearing (instead of being set by
the platform). Our concept of clustering buyer and seller nodes via facilities is a form of market
segmentation. However, unlike [Banerjee et al., 2017], the flow lower bound prevents us from
arbitrarily spliing a market into smaller sub-markets, making our problem technically different.
Dynamic Marketplaces. Our work on dynamic marketplaces is related to several recent works
on online scheduling under stochastic arrivals of tasks onmachineswith limited resources [Chawla et al.,
2017a,b, Hajiaghayi et al., 2005]. Tasks have (private) types comprising their value, arrival time,
and deadline; the platform’s goal is to maximize welfare while truthfully eliciting the type. While
similar to our work on pricing resources or tasks, they allow agents to choose assignments based
on posted prices (envy-freeness). Another difference is the markets considered in their studies are
one-sided. Blum et al. [Blum et al., 2002] consider online two-sided markets with fixed bids, and
present competitive algorithms for maximizing profit or number of matches. ough their ob-
jectives are simpler, their methods will necessarily discard a constant fraction of feasible matches,
which can lead to significant user dissatisfaction. In contrast, our focus is on ensuring high service
availability which corresponds to small user abandonment.
Dynamic two-sided markets also serve as motivation for recent work on “online matching with
delays” [Azar et al., 2017, Emek et al., 2016]. Here, buyers and sellers arrive online in a metric
space, and can be matched at any time subsequently. e goal is to minimize the total distance
cost plus waiting cost, and the authors present a log-competitive algorithm. ese models do not
incorporate pricing. Further, our dynamic marketplacemodels are more closely related to dynamic
matchings with stochastic arrivals, and we review this literature in Section 5.
Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, and Kamesh Munagala 5
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
ere is a metric space G(V , E) with an associated distance function c . We assume buyers and
sellers are fluid and arrive at nodes in this metric space and must be matched with each other. e
metric distance captures the match quality – if demand at node j is matched to supply at node j ′,
the disutility to the system is captured by c(j, j ′).
Demand and Supply Functions. Each node j ∈ V is associated with a demand function Fj
and a supply function Hj . When offered price p, we assume the demand (i.e., buyers) at node j is
d jFj (p), where Fj (p) is a non-increasing function of p corresponding to the survival function of a
continuous density function fj on valuations; formally Fj (p) =
∫ ∞
v=p
fj (v)dv . In other words, the
volume of buyers is d j , and when quoted a price p, only buyers with valuations at least p choose
to participate, and hence the stream of buyers is thinned by a factor Fj (p). We assume there is a
finite price pmax so that Fj (pmax) = 0 for all j ∈ V .
Similarly, when offered wagew , the supply of sellers arriving at node j is sjHj (w), where Hj (w)
is a non-decreasing function of w , corresponding to the CDF of a continuous density function hj
on costs; formally Hj (w) =
∫ w
c=0
hj (c)dc . When offered wage w , all sellers with cost at most w
participate, resulting in supply sjHj (w). We assume that Hj (0) = 0, i.e., sellers accrue 0 utility by
not participating in the platform.
In this section, wemake the standard regularity assumptions (a` laMyerson-Saerthwaite [Myerson and Saerthwaite,
1983]) on the density functions fj and hj . In particular, we assume xF
−1
j (x) is concave in x and
yH−1j (y) is convex in y. is is true for instance, for all log-concave densities fj and hj , which
includes Normal, Exponential, and Uniform distributions. In Section 6, we discuss how the conti-
nuity and regularity assumptions can be removed by using loery pricing.
Facilities. As discussed before, the platform opens a set of facilities or “canonical features” in the
metric space and routes demand and supply fractionally to open facilities within distance bound
R in order to match them up. (erefore, the distance of any match is at most 2R.) It ensures
high service availability by ensuring the following two intuitive constraints on the flow of supply
and demand arriving each open facility. We justify these constraints via queueing arguments in
Section 5.
Flow Balance. Since the flow arriving at the facility are matched, the total amount of supply
and demand are equal.
Flow Lower Bound. e facility is sufficiently thick, that is, the total amount of supply (resp.
demand) is at least L.
2.1 Two-sided Facility Location
We now have all the ingredients to make our problem, Two-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R), precise. Let
F ⊆ V the set of all candidate facilities; we set F = V . For each node j , BR (j) ⊆ F denotes the set
of all the facilities i ∈ F such that c(i, j) ≤ R. Similarly, for each facility i , we define BR (i) as the
set of all the nodes j ∈ V such that c(i, j) ≤ R. A solution to Two-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R) is specified
by the following:
• An assignment of price pj and wage w j to each node j ∈ V . If the price (resp. wage) at
node j is pmax (resp. 0), we assume this node generates no demand (resp. supply).
• A set of locations S ⊆ F for opening the facilities; and
• A routing scheme ®xdj (resp. ®xsj ) for each demand (resp. supply) node j ∈ V that generates
non-zero demand (resp. supply). For i ∈ S , if xdi j > 0 then i ∈ BR (j). Further,
∑
i ∈BR (j) x
d
i j =
Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kostas Kollias, and Kamesh Munagala 6
1 for all nodes j ∈ V that generate non-zero demand; similarly, ∑i ∈BR (j) xsi j = 1 for each
j ∈ V with non-zero supply.
Note that the flow of demand (resp. supply) from node j ∈ V to facility i ∈ S is d jFj (pj )xdi j (resp.
sjHj (w j )xsi j ). We enforce that the flows satisfy the flow balance and flow lower bound conditions at
each i ∈ S .
Weak Budget Balance. e next constraint is weak budget balance, which corresponds to profit
being non-negative. is is wrien as:
Profit =
∑
j∈V
(
d jpjFj (pj ) − sjw jHj (w j )
) ≥ 0
Surplus (Gains from Trade) Objective. We first define the following quantities:
Vj (p) = d j
∫ ∞
v=p
v fj (v)dv and Cj (w) = sj
∫ w
c=0
chj (c)dc
respectively denote the total value of buyers generated by node j when the price there is p and the
cost of sellers at node j when the wage there is w . e surplus objective can then be wrien as:
Social Surplus =
∑
j∈V
(Vj (pj ) − Cj (w j ))
is defines the problem Two-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R)
oughwe focus on surplus in the paper, the same techniques extend to other objectives such as
maximizing throughput or volume ofmatches, defined as the total demand (or supply):
∑
j∈V d jFj (pj ).
It also extends to the objective of maximizing profit defined above.
2.2 Hardness of Approximation
We characterize the approximation ratio of any algorithm forTwo-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R) as (α ,γ ),
if the resulting solution relaxes the distance bound of an assignment to a facility to αR, ensures
lower bound L, and has surplusOPT/γ , where OPT is the optimal surplus.
Theorem 2.1. It is NP-Hard to find a (α ,γ ) approximation for Two-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R) unless
α ≥ 2 or γ ≥ Lc for some constant c > 0.
Proof. We reduce from Maximum Independent Set in k-regular graphs (k-MIS). Given a k-MIS
instance with n vertices and m = kn/2 edges, construct a metric space where each edge in the
k-regular graph G(V , E) has length 2R. Place a demand node at the mid-point of each edge, and
a supply node at each vertex. We set L = k . Each supply node has sj = k , and supply function
H−1(r ) = 1 − δ for r ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, each demand node has d j = 1, and demand function
F−1(q) = 1 for q ∈ [0, 1]. Since the distance threshold is R, the facilities are opened at vertices of
the graph. Each such facility must see k units of supply and demand, which means all neighboring
demand is routed there, leading to surplus (resp. profit) kδ at that facility. Since two open facilities
cannot share a demand, this means the open facilities form an independent set. erefore, the
surplus of Two-Sided Fac-Loc(k,R) is δ times the size of the maximum independent set in G .
is is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of kc for some constant c > 0; see [Alon et al.,
1995, Hazan et al., 2006]. erefore, we need to relax the distance bound by factor of 2. 
In the sequel, we present a (4, 1 + ϵ) approximation. For the algorithm to have polynomial
running time, they also need lose a small additive amount in the objective; as we show later, this
quantity can be exponentially small.
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3 LINEAR PROGRAMMING RELAXATION
We now formulate Two-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R) as an integer linear program. For ease of exposi-
tion, we compare against an optimal solution that is restricted to using prices from a fixed set P
andwages from a fixed setW. Our solution is not restricted to using prices andwages from this set.
In Appendix A.2, we show that our LP admits to a polynomial time solution of arbitrary additive
accuracy when this assumption is relaxed, and demand/supply distributions are continuous.
Note that we assume pmax ∈ P and 0 ∈ W, and at this price (resp. wage) the demand (resp.
supply) is identically zero. is is the price (resp. wage) where this node becomes an outlier and
the solution is not required to open a facility nearby.
Instead of writing our LP using prices and wages, we use the associated demand/supply values.
Let Qj = {q |q = Fj (p),p ∈ P} and Rj = {r | r = Hj (w),w ∈ W}. e case where the node is an
outlier now corresponds to seing q = 0 (resp. r = 0).
We redefine the valuations and costs using supply/demand values as follows:
Vj (q) = d j
∫ ∞
v=F −1j (q)
v fj (v)dv and Cj (r ) = sj
∫ H−1j (r )
c=0
chj (c)dc (1)
respectively denote the total value of buyers generated by node j when the price there is F−1j (q),
and the cost of sellers at node j when the wage there is H−1j (r ).
Variables. For each candidate facility i ∈ F , let yi ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator variable that a facility
is opened at that location in the metric space. Let α jq = 1 if the price at node j ∈ V corresponds to
q ∈ Qj . Similarly define βjr for r ∈ Rj . e variable zi jq is non-zero only if α jq = 1 and i ∈ BR (j).
In this case, it is the fraction of j’s demand that is routed to i . We define zi jr similarly for supply.
Note that the actual flow from j to i is d jqzi jq ; similarly for sellers.
Objective and Weak Budget Balance. e objective of social surplus and the profit being non-
negative can be captured by:
Surplus Objective: max
∑
j∈V
(∑
q∈Qj α jqVj (q) −
∑
r ∈Rj βjrCj (r )
)
(2)
Weak Budget Balance:
∑
j∈V
(∑
q∈Qj α jqd jqF
−1
j (q) −
∑
r ∈Rj βjr sjrH
−1
j (r )
)
≥ 0 (3)
Feasibility. e following constraints connect the variables together. We present these con-
straints only for buyers (that is, q ∈ Qj ); the constraints for sellers is obtained by replacing q
with r ∈ Rj . First, for each q ∈ Qj , we need to choose one price for buyers (resp. sellers).∑
q∈Qj
α jq = 1 ∀j ∈ V (4)∑
i ∈BR (j)
zi jq = α jq ∀j ∈ V ,q ∈ Qj (5)
Next, if demand is fractionally routed from j to i , then i should be open and within distance R.
Note that we need to ignore the case where q = 0 (resp. r = 0) since in this case, the demand (resp.
supply) routed is zero, so that there is no need for a nearby facility.∑
q∈Qj,q>0
zi jq ≤ yi ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j) (6)
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Service Availability. We finally encode flow balance and flow lower bound at each facility:∑
j∈BR (i )
d j
∑
q∈Qj
qzi jq =
∑
j∈BR (i )
sj
∑
r ∈Rj
rzi jr ∀i ∈ F (7)∑
j∈BR (i )
d j
∑
q∈Qj
qzi jq ≥ Lyi ∀i ∈ F (8)
If we replace the integrality constraints on {yi } and the {α jq , βjr } with yi ,α jq , βjr ∈ [0, 1], the
above is a linear programming relaxation of the problem.
3.1 Integrality Gap and Stronger LP Formulation
e main technical hurdle arises because of the flow lower bound constraint: e LP optimum
(and even an integer optimum) can now open facilities i which have positive surplus but negative
profit, and compensate for the loss in profit by other facilitiess with positive profit. Note that
Constraints (6) and (4) together imply:∑
i ∈BR (j)
yi ≥ 1 − α j0 ∀ Demand nodes j
and similarly for supply nodes. We call the quantities α j0 (resp. βj0) the outlier fraction of node
j , and correspond to the case where the node is priced in such a way that it does not generate
flow. In this case, there is no need to open a facility to satisfy j . erefore, if α j0βj0 > 0, then the
above constraints could imply
∑
i ∈BR (j) yi < 1. is means there could only be a small fractional
facility open in the vicinity of j , which can account for a lot of the surplus. is makes the LP have
super-polynomial integrality gap and we present an example in Appendix A.1.
We therefore add constraints to the above LP formulation so that has bounded integrality gap.
Before showing how to strengthen the LP, we present the following easy claim, which implies that
once we round {yi }, the remaining solution can easily be made integral.
Lemma 3.1. Given any feasible LP solution, there is an equivalent solution that assigns only one
price (resp. wage) per demand (resp. supply) node, that preserves all constraints and does not decrease
the objective.
Proof. e rounding of α jq , βjr is simple. Let qˆj =
∑
q∈Qj qα jq and rˆ j =
∑
r ∈Rj r βjr . Set the
price of location j to be F−1j (qˆj ) and the wage at j to be H−1j (rˆ j ). In other words, set αˆ jqˆj ← 1 and
βˆjrˆ j ← 1. Further set zˆi jqˆj ←
∑
q∈Q′j zi jq
q
qˆj
and zˆi jrˆ j ←
∑
r ∈R′j zi jr
r
rˆ j
.
Note that this process preserves the demand and supply from node j to facility i , which preserves
all the constraints in the LP formulation. Note further that the function qF−1j (q) is concave in q by
the regularity of the demand function. erefore,∑
q
α jqqF
−1
j (q) ≤
(∑
q
α jqq
)
F−1j
(∑
q
α jqq
)
= qˆ jF
−1
j (qˆj )
Similarly, sincewe assumed rH−1j (r ) is convex in r (by regularity of supply), we have
∑
r βjr rH
−1
j (r ) ≥
rˆ jH
−1
j (rˆ j ). erefore, this transformation preserves weak budget balance. Next, we note thatVj (q)
is always a concave function of q and Cj (r ) is always a convex function. erefore, the above
argument also implies the social surplus does not decrease in the above transformation. 
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Define a variable for the surplusWi and profit Ri of facility i respectively as:
Wi =
∑
j∈BR (i )
©­«
∑
q∈Q′j
Vj (q)zi jq −
∑
r ∈R′j
Cj (r )zi jr ª®¬ (9)
Ri =
∑
j∈BR (i )
©­«
∑
q∈Q′j
d jqF
−1
j (q)zi jq −
∑
r ∈R′j
sjrH
−1
j (r )zi jr ª®¬ (10)
en the objective can be rewrien as: Maximize
∑
iWi , and weak budget balance is
∑
i Ri ≥ 0.
Further note thatWi ≥ Ri since for any q, r , we haveVj (q) ≥ d jqF−1j (q), and Cj (r ) ≤ sjrH−1j (r ) if
we integrate the expressions in Equation (1) by parts.
Stronger LP Formulation. Let ϵ > 0 be any constant, and let θ = 1
ϵ
. We guess the θ facilities
in the optimum solution that have the most surplus. ere are two cases. First, if the optimum
solution opens fewer than θ facilities, we can perform a brute force search over all integer solutions
that open at most θ facilities. is can be done inO(nθ ) time, where n = |V |. For each selection of
facilities, Lemma 3.1 implies that solving the LP formulation with the correspondingyi set to 1 and
the rest to zero yields the optimal surplus (or results in declaring infeasibility). We can therefore
find the surplus maximizing solution among these in polynomial time; call this surplusW1.
In the other case, the optimum solution opens more than θ facilities. In this case, for every
choice of parameter W ≥ 0 scaled to powers of (1 + ϵ), and every subset S ⊆ F with |S | = θ ,
define LP(W, S) as having all of Constraints (2) – (8), plus the following new ones:
Wi ≤ Wyi ∀i ∈ F \ S (11)
yi = 1 ∀i ∈ S (12)∑
i ∈S
Wi ≥ Wθ (1 − ϵ) (13)
Let OPT denote the optimum surplus, and letW2 = max{LP(W, S) |W ≥ 0, S s.t. |S | = θ }.
en, it is easy to see that OPT ≤ max (W1,W2): IfOPT opens fewer than θ facilities, then clearly
W1 ≥ OPT , sinceW1 opens all possible choices of at most θ facilities. Otherwise, letW ∗i denote the
surplus generated by open facility i in OPT . LetW ∗ denote the θ th largest value ofW ∗i . Choose
W ∈ [W ∗,W ∗(1+ϵ)], and S as the set of θ facilities inOPT withW ∗i ≥W ∗. is induces a feasible
solution to the above constraints, so that the LP optimum is at least OPT .
3.2 Structural Characterization of LP Optimum
We now present a structural characterization about the LP optimum. is is crucial for the
rounding that we present subsequently, since it allows sufficient mass of facility to be located in
roughly the same neighborhood.
Recall α j0, βj0 are the fractions to which node j is an outlier, i.e. has zero flow. ese variables
are the reason the simpler LP had large integrality gap, since they allow facilities in BR (j) to be
open to small fractions. Our main observation is the following:
Lemma 3.2 (Structural Characterization). ere is a (1 + ϵ) approximation to the objective
of LP(W, S) that satisfies:
∀i ∈ F , yi ∈ (0, 1) ⇒ ∃j ∈ BR (i) s.t. α j0βj0 = 0
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High level Idea. Before presenting the proof, we present the high level idea. Consider a facility
that violates the statement. If it hasRi > 0, then consider all LP variables {yi , zi jq , zi jr } correspond-
ing to some such facility i and uniformly increase them. is increases both profit and surplus. We
can decrease the fractions {α j0, βj0} to which any node j connected to i is assigned as outlier to
compensate the fraction to which it is assigned i . Note that Constraints (7) and (8) are local to a
single facility. Since we scale up all variables corresponding to a facility, we preserve these con-
straints. If we keep up this process, then either the facility is completely open (yi = 1); or some
demand/supply node assigned to it has α j0 = 0 or βj0 = 0. (is must hold in the LP optimum.)
On the other hand, if Wi > 0 but Ri < 0, then increasing its LP variables would hurt profit,
which may violate the budget balance constraint; while reducing the variables would increase
profit but hurt the surplus. e idea now is the following: Take any pair of such facilities; increase
the variables for one facility while decrease them for the other. ere is always a way of doing this
so that both the total profit and surplus do not decrease – this is essentially a fractional knapsack
argument. Again, since we uniformly scale all variables corresponding to a facility, we preserve
all constraints. Note that the process can also stop when a facility closes (yi = 0). Eventually, we
run out of pairs, so that for all but one facility, the above characterization holds.
At this point, the strengthened LP kicks in. e singleton facility violating the above lemma
was fractionally open and had Ri < 0. It has surplus at mostW by Constraint (11). But we have
integrally open facilities that generate surplus at least W (1−ϵ )ϵ by Constraint (13), which means
closing the singleton facility reduces surplus by at most (1 − ϵ), and preserves budget balance.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We first simplify the LP. Let Q′j = Qj \ {0} and R ′j = Rj \ {0}. Let
η j =
∑
q∈Q′j α jq and ϕ j =
∑
r ∈R′j βjr respectively denote the fractions to which j is assigned prices
(wages) that correspond to non-zero demand (supply). We can rewrite the constraints (4) and (5)
as:
η j =
∑
q∈Q′j
∑
i ∈BR (j)
zi jq ≤ 1 and ϕ j =
∑
r ∈R′j
∑
i ∈BR (j)
zi jr ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ V (14)
and set α j0 = 1 − η j , and βj0 = 1 − ϕ j . Recall from Equations (9) and (10) thatWi and Ri are
respectively the surplus and profit of facility i in the LP optimum.
We call node j fully demand-utilized ifη j = 1, and fully supply-utilized ifϕ j = 1. We say that node
j is partially demand-connected to facility i ∈ F if ∑q∈Q′j zi jq > 0, and partially supply-connected
if
∑
r ∈R′j zi jr > 0. Let JD (i) denote the set of nodes that are partially demand-connected to i ∈ F ,
and JS (i) be the set that is partially supply-connected.
Lemma 3.3. In the LP optimum, for any i ∈ F with yi > 0, we haveWi > 0. Furthermore, all
except one facility with yi > 0 satisfy the following condition: either yi = 1; or there exists j ∈ JD (i),
such that j is fully demand-utilized; or there exists j ∈ JS (i) such that j is fully supply-utilized.
Proof. First, note thatWi ≥ Ri . Suppose an open facility hasWi ≤ 0. is implies Ri ≤ 0.
Consider a different solution that sets yi = 0 and zi jq = zi jr = 0 for all j ∈ V ,q ∈ Q′j , r ∈ R ′j . We
adjust η j and ϕ j for each j ∈ V to preserve constraint (14). is new solution hasWi = Ri = 0 and
has at least as large surplus and profit. Since we set all LP variables corresponding to i to zero, this
satisfies constraints (6), (7), and (8), and is therefore feasible for the LP.
We therefore only focus on facilities whoseWi > 0. Consider the set of these facilities and split
them into two groups. Let
S1 = {i ∈ F |yi ∈ (0, 1) and Ri < 0} and S2 = {i ∈ F |yi ∈ (0, 1) and Ri ≥ 0}
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Assume that for all of these facilities, there is no j ∈ JD (i), such that j is fully demand-utilized and
no j ∈ JS (i) such that j is fully supply-utilized
First consider the facilities in set S2, we can increase the LP variables till the condition of the
lemma is satisfied; this process only increases both profit and surplus, preserving all constraints.
We do this as follows: Suppose no j ∈ JD (i) is fully demand-utilized and no j ∈ JS (i) is fully
supply-utilized. In this case, let
θ = min
(
1
yi
, min
j∈JD (i )
(
1 −∑q∈Q′j ∑i ′,i zi ′jq∑
q∈Q′j zi jq
)
, min
j∈JS (i )
(
1 −∑r ∈R′j ∑i ′,i zi ′jr∑
r ∈R′j zi jr
))
Since η j < 1 for all j ∈ JD (i) and ϕ j < 1 for all j ∈ JS (i), we have θ > 1. Suppose we increase yi ,
zi jq for all j ∈ JD (i),q ∈ Q′j , and zi jr for all j ∈ JS (i), r ∈ R ′j by a factor of θ . We will still have
η j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ JD (i) and ϕ j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ JS (i). However, either yi or one of these values will
become exactly 1. Note that since we scaled all LP variables corresponding to i by the same factor,
this preserves constraints (6), (7), and (8). e surplus and profit of this facility increase by a factor
θ > 1, which contradicts the optimality of the LP solution. erefore, the facilities in S2 all have a
neighboring j that is either fully demand-utilized or fully supply-utilized.
Next consider the facilities in set S1. Suppose the condition in the lemma is not satisfied, so that
there are two facilities i and i ′ with yi ,yi ′ ∈ (0, 1), and with no neighboring j that is either fully
demand-utilized or fully supply-utilized. SupposeWi/|Ri | = a andWi ′/|Ri ′ | = b with a ≥ b. We
multiply each LP variable corresponding to i by a factor of (1 + δ ), and multiply each LP variable
corresponding to i ′ by a factor of
(
1 − WiWi′ δ
)
. Using the same argument as above, this process
preserves the constraints that are specific to a facility, since all variables are changed by the same
factor. e increase in surplus of facility i is δWi , and the decrease in surplus of facility i
′ is δWi ,
so the overall surplus is preserved. e decrease in profit of facility i is |Ri |δ , and the increase in
profit of facility i ′ is |Ri ′ | WiWi′ δ ≥ |Ri |δ by our assumption that a ≥ b. erefore, this process cannot
decrease profit, hence all constraints are preserved. We choose δ as the smallest value that either
makes facility i have yi = 1 or one neighboring j either fully supply or demand utilized, or that
sets the variables of facility i ′ to zero. In all cases, the size of set S1 reduces by one. We repeat this
process till there is only one facility in S1, completing the proof. 
e following corollary now restates Lemma 3.2, completing its proof.
Corollary 3.4. ere is a (1+ϵ)-approximation to the LP optimum where any facility withyi > 0
satisfies the following condition: either yi = 1; or there exists j ∈ JD (i), such that j is fully demand-
utilized; or there exists j ∈ JS (i) such that j is fully supply-utilized.
Proof. By Constraint (12), there is a set of facilities S that are fully open (i.e., yi = 1) and∑
i ∈SWi ≥ W 1−ϵϵ by Constraint (13). e rounding in Lemma 3.3 does not touch these facilities,
since we only increase/decrease variables corresponding to partially open facilities (i.e., those with
yi ∈ (0, 1)). Lemma 3.3 implies there is only facility i that violates the condition of the corollary.
is facility must have surplusWi ≤ Wyi ≤ W by Constraint (11). is means closing this facility
(seing all its associated variables to zero) reduces the LP optimum by at most a factor of (1 − ϵ).
Since the previous lemma implies this facility had Ri < 0, this means closing it only increases
profit, preserving weak budget balance. 
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4 ROUNDING THE LP RELAXATION
erounding now follows approaches similar to those in [Friggstad et al., 2016,Williamson and Shmoys,
2011]. We first present the high-level idea. Note that if a node j has α j0 = 0 or βj0 = 0, then Con-
straint (6) implies
∑
i ∈BR (j) yi ≥ 1. Consider an independent set of such nodes, such that no two are
fractionally assigned to the same facility. For any j in this set, move all partially open facilities in
BR (j) to j itself, so that there is a facility integrally opened at j . Since we move an entire facility,
we preserve all flows, so that flow balance and lower bound are preserved, and so is profit. Now a
demand/supply can be assigned a distance 2R away, and the opened facilities are integral.
At this point, consider any fractionally open facility i . It must have a node j adjacent to it that
satisfies the condition in Lemma 3.2. If j has a facility completely open at its location, then move i
to location j . Otherwise, j was not part of the independent set in the previous step, which means
j and j ′ shared a fractionally open facility, and the previous step opened a facility completely at
j ′. In this case, we move i to j ′, again preserving all flows. is means any demand/supply moves
distance at most 4R, preserving all the LP constraints.
4.1 Rounding Facilities
We now present the rounding algorithm in detail. Initially, all facilities i ∈ F with yi > 0 are
partially open. Node j ∈ V is untouched if for all i such that j ∈ JD (i)∪ JS (i), the facility i is partially
open. LetU be the set of untouched nodes, and let Z be the set that is either fully demand-utilized
or fully supply-utilized. LetUf = U ∩ Z .
Phase 1. Consider any j ∈ Uf . W.l.o.g., assume η j = 1; the case where ϕ j = 1 is symmetric. Let
N (j) = {i |j ∈ JD (i)}. For every i ∈ N (j), we “move” i to location j; call the new facility at location
j as i∗. is means we set
• y¯i∗ ← ∑i ∈N (j) yi and y¯i ← 0 ∀i ∈ N (j);
• z¯i∗ j′q ← ∑i ∈N (j) zi j′q and z¯i j′q ← 0 ∀j ′ ∈ V ,q ∈ Qj′ , i ∈ N (j)
• z¯i∗ j′r ← ∑i ∈N (j) zi j′r and z¯i j′r ← 0 ∀j ′ ∈ V , r ∈ Rj′ , i ∈ N (j)
From constraint (6), and the fact that η j = 1, we have:
y¯i∗ =
∑
i ∈N (j)
yi ≥
∑
i ∈BR (j)
∑
q∈Q′j
zi jq = η j = 1
Subsequently, we mark every i ∈ N (j) as closed, and mark i∗ as completely open. Furthermore, we
mark every j ′ that was reassigned in the above steps as touched.
Note that in the last three steps, any agents at a node j ′ that was initially assigned to i ∈ N (j)
is now assigned to i∗. Since each of the distances j ′ → i and i → j is at most R, the distance from
j ′ to i∗ is at most 2R. erefore, this step relaxes the distance of a feasible assignment to a facility
from R to 2R.
is process trivially preserves the objective and weak budget balance, as well as constraints
(14). Moreover, constraints (6) and (7) are satisfied since we add both sides of the constraints
corresponding to i ∈ N (j) to obtain the constraint for i∗. Finally, to see that (8) is satisfied for i∗,
note that ∑
j′∈JD (i∗)
∑
q∈Q′
j′
d j′qz¯i∗ j′q =
∑
i ∈N (j)
∑
j′∈JD (i )
∑
q∈Q′
j′
d j′qzi j′q ≥ L
∑
i ∈N (j)
yi ≥ L
We continue this process, finding a node j ∈ Uf , and merging all facilities in N (j) to one location.
At the end of this process, the set Uf is empty.
Phase 2. At the end of Phase 1, each node j which is touched (including all fully utilized nodes)
route some fraction of their demand (or supply) to at least one facility that is completely open.
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However, there could still be partially open facilities with yi ∈ (0, 1) to which demand and sup-
ply are assigned. Consider these partially open facilities in arbitrary order. Suppose we are con-
sidering facility i and there exists touched and fully utilized node j such that
∑
q∈Q′j zi jq > 0
(resp.
∑
r ∈R′j zi jr > 0). Consider the completely open facility i
∗ such that
∑
q∈Q′j z¯i∗ jq > 0 or∑
r ∈R′j z¯i∗ jr > 0. We move the facility i to location i
∗, updating the variables just as in Phase 1; i.e.,
we set
• y¯i∗ ← y¯i∗ + yi and y¯i ← 0;
• z¯i∗ j′q ← z¯i∗ j′q + zi j′q and z¯i j′q ← 0 ∀j ′ ∈ V ,q ∈ Qj′
• z¯i∗ j′r ← z¯i∗ j′r + zi j′r and z¯i j′r ← 0 ∀j ′ ∈ V , r ∈ Rj′
e argument that all constraints are preserved follows just as before. For any j ′ that was
partially assigned to i , the new assignment is to i∗. is distance is at most
c(j ′, i∗) ≤ c(j ′, i) + c(i, j) + c(j, i∗) ≤ R + R + 2R = 4R
where we note that the distance j → i∗ was at most 2R because j was potentially reassigned to i∗
in Phase 1. We mark all nodes j ′ that are reassigned in this process as touched.
At the end of this process, suppose there are still partially open facilities with yi ∈ (0, 1). By
Corollary 3.4, each of these facilities i must have some j ∈ Z partially assigned to it. At the end of
Phase 1, we have the invariant that j < Uf , since Uf is empty. is means j was touched on Phase
1. But in that case, i must have been reassigned in Phase 2, which is a contradiction. erefore, at
this point, all facilities are either closed (y¯i = 0) or completely open (y¯i ≥ 1). Furthermore, for any
variable z¯i jq > 0 (resp. z¯i jr > 0), the facility i is completely open; the distance from j to i is at most
4R; for each completely open facility, the rate of supply equals the rate of demand (Constraint (7)),
and finally, the total flow is at least L (Constraint (8)).
4.2 Final Steps and Running Time
At this point, the facilities are opened integrally. Lemma 3.1 now implies that we can choose
one price/wage per node preserving all constraints and the objective. is completes the proof of
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For any constant ϵ > 0, there is a (4, 1+ϵ) approximation algorithm for Two-Sided
Fac-Loc(L,R).
Note that the surplus can become arbitrarily close to zero. erefore, for parameter ∆ > 0, we
will allow additive error ∆ in the surplus objective. Note that the maximum possible surplus is
Wmax = (∑j d j )pmax, which is an upper bound onW. If we assume the surplus is at least ∆, then
maxiW
∗
i ≥ ∆/n. Since the top 1/ϵ facilities on OPT have surplusW(1 − ϵ)/ϵ , this means we can
setW ≥ ϵ∆2n erefore, the number of choices ofW isO
(
1
ϵ log
nWmax
ϵ∆
)
. For each choice ofW, we
need to solve O(n1/ϵ ) LPs, so that the overall number of LPs isO
(
n1/ϵ
ϵ
log nWmax
ϵ∆
)
.
Note that ∆ can be exponentially small, and our algorithm for solving the LP in Appendix A.2
will lose such an additive factor in the objective anyway. ough we omit details, the same tech-
niques work for approximating profit as well as approximating throughput (volume of trade) sub-
ject to weak budget balance. If the objective is profit, we can achieve optimal objective by directly
rounding the single LP in Section 3 (details similar to Section 6). If the objective is throughput (or
total flow) subject to weak budget balance, then the flow to any open facility is at least L, so that
we only need to guess the θ open facilities in OPT and not the flow to them. is means we only
need to solve O(n1/ϵ ) LPs to achieve a (1 + ϵ) approximation to throughput, again relaxing the
distance constraint by a constant factor.
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5 QUEUEING-THEORETIC JUSTIFICATION: DYNAMIC MARKETPLACES
In the facility location model discussed above, we imposed a lower bound L on the flow routed
to any facility. In the absence of this constraint, i.e., when L = 0, the problems are in fact poly-time
solvable. For instance, to maximize surplus (gains from trade), we can simply write the standard
welfare maximization LP ignoring prices and wages. Its dual yields prices and wages that will be
strongly budget balanced. erefore, the entire hardness of the problem comes from the lower
bound constraint. is begs the question: Why have this constraint at all?
Dynamic Marketplace Model. We now present a dynamic marketplace model that provides
queueing-theoretic justification for these constraints. is model has the following features:
• Buyer and seller types are located in a metric space just as before.
• Buyers and sellers are no longer fluid. Instead, buyers at node j arrive as a Poisson process
with rate d jFj (p) when quoted price p, and when quoted a price p; similarly, sellers follow
a Poisson process with rate sjHj (w).
• Each buyer and seller has a private patience level or deadline; if not matched within their
deadline, they abandon the system. e platform knows the patience distribution.
e stochastic control problem that we term dynamic marketplace problem can be summarized
by two control decisions:
(1) Pricing decision. Choose static prices pj and wagesw j at each node j ∈ V ; and
(2) Scheduling decision. is matches feasible buyer-seller pairs and removes them from the
system. is decision is dynamic, depending on the entire state of the system as captured
by the number of unmatched buyers and sellers at different nodes at any point of time.
e goal is to design a stochastic control policy that maximizes the long-term average surplus
subject to long-term budget balance. We insist all scheduled matches must involve a current buyer
and seller with metric distance at most R. e key difference is in the service availability guarantee:
Given the stochastic nature of our arrivals, there is always some probability that an incoming buyer
or seller exhausts her patience before being matched. A more realistic goal is to design policies
that guarantee a minimum level of service availability. We quantify this via the long-term average
probability of abandonment of agents. Formally, given a parameter η > 0 as input, the goal of the
platform is to make the abandonment probability at most η.
Scheduling Policies. Constructing the optimal policy for the dynamic marketplace problem is
closely related to several lines of work in dynamicmatchings over a compatibility graph – in kidney
exchanges [Akbarpour et al., 2014] where patients abandon the exchange if their health fails; in
control of matching queues for housing allocation [Caldentey et al., 2009]; and more generally
in service system design [Adan et al., 2015, Adan and Weiss, 2012, Gurvich et al., 2014], wherein
customers and servers arrive stochastically and are matched according to a compatibility graph.
In all these models, the choice of whom to match an arriving agent to depends on the entire set of
agents waiting at different nodes, leading to the “curse of dimensionality”.
Given this curse of dimensionality, we consider the restricted sub-class of matching policies
where the platform creates facilities in themetric space, and uses each facility to cater to a different
set of mutually-compatible agent types. Arriving agents are randomly routed to a compatible
facility, where they are queued up to be matched to agents on the other side. e probabilistic
routing is fixed over time, and does not depend on the state of the facilities.
Each facility maintains a queue of active buyers and sellers that have been assigned there, ig-
nores what location they came from, and matches them up using an optimal scheduling policy
for minimizing abandonment rate using only the current state of that particular queue. We will
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enforce the constraint that for any facility, the long-term abandonment probability is at most η,
which in turn will ensure the overall abandonment probability is at most η.
Suppose we assume buyer deadlines are distributed as Exponential(κ), and seller deadlines are
distributed as Exponential(γ ). ough these distributions are known, the scheduling decisions
at any facility are made without knowing the patience level of any individual agent. en, any
work-conserving policy (including FIFO) is optimal. If an agent’s deadline expires and there is no
agent to match it with in the queue, this agent is considered abandoned. We build on results from
queueing theory [Ward and Glynn, 2003] to bound this abandonment rate tightly as follows:
Theorem 5.1. Suppose λ and µ be the (Poisson) arrival rates of buyers and sellers into a facility.
Assume buyer deadlines are distributed as Exponential(κ), and seller deadlines are distributed as
Exponential(γ ). en the FIFO policy has abandonment rate at most η when:
(1) ere is flow balance, that is, λ = µ ; and
(2) ere is a flow lower bound, that is, λ ≥ 32
(
min(γ ,κ)
η2
)
.
For η ≤ 16 , the above conditions are also necessary to a constant factor: For the abandonment proba-
bility to be at most η, it must hold that λ/µ ∈ [1 − η, 1 + η]; and min(λ, µ) ≥ 114000
(
min(γ ,κ)
η2
)
.
Proof. e behavior of a facility is captured via the following birth-death Markov chain: con-
sider the state-space {. . . , s(2), s(1), 0,b(1),b(2), . . .}, where 0 = s(0) = b(0) denotes the state that
the facility is empty, while for any n ≥ 1, the state b(n) denotes that there are n buyers queued up,
and state s(n) denote that there are n sellers queued up. For any n ≥ 1, the transition rate from
b(n) to b(n + 1) is λ, and for s(n) to s(n + 1) is µ; on the other hand, the rate of transition from s(n)
to s(n− 1) is nγ +λ, while from b(n) to b(n− 1) is nκ + µ . Here, the term nγ corresponds to the rate
of abandonment of sellers as their deadlines expires, and nκ is the rate of abandonment of buyers.
We now show the sufficient conditions, and relegate the proof of the necessary conditions to
Appendix A.3. Assume that λ = µ . Let q0 denote the steady state probability of the queue being
empty. Let
Pr[State = s(n)] = αn Pr[State = b(n)] = βn
where α0 = β0 = q0. We have the following balance equations:
αnnγ = λ(αn−1 − αn) and βnnκ = λ(βn−1 − βn)
Adding these equations, we have:
∑∞
n=1 (αnnγ + βnnκ) = 2λq0. Note that the LHS here is the total
abandonment rate, and since the total arrival rate of agents (buyers and sellers) is 2λ, this means
the abandonment probability is exactly q0.
Since αn =
λ
λ+nγ
αn−1 and βn = λλ+nκ βn−1, we have by telescoping:
αn = q0
λn∏n
j=1(λ+jγ ) = q0
∏n
j=1
1
(1+j γλ )
βn = q0
λn∏n
j=1(λ+jκ) = q0
∏n
j=1
1
(1+j κλ )
Since these probability values sum to one, this implies
1
q0
= 1 +
∞∑
n=1
(
n∏
j=1
1(
1 + j
γ
λ
) + n∏
j=1
1(
1 + j κ
λ
) ) (15)
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For given κ and γ , this is an increasing function of λ. erefore, q0 ≤ η translates to a bound of
the form λ ≥ L. An upper bound Lη on L can be computed as follows. Let c = min(γ ,κ)λ . en,
1
q0
≥ 1 +
∞∑
n=1
©­­«
n∏
j=1
1(
1 + j
min(γ ,κ)
λ
) ª®®¬
≥
∞∑
n=0
e−cn
2/2 − e−c ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−cx
2/2dx − e−c =
√
π
2c
− e−c ≥
√
2
3c
where the second inequality uses 1+x ≤ ex for all x ≥ 0. erefore, if we insist
√
2λ
3min(γ ,κ) ≥ 1η , this
ensures the abandonment probability is at most η. is translates to the following lower bound:
λ ≥ L = 3
2
· min(γ ,κ)
η2
is completes the proof of the sufficient conditions. We present the proof of the necessary condi-
tion in Appendix A.3. 
We have therefore shown that a sufficient condition for bounding the abandonment probability
at any facility by η reduces to saying the flow to the facility is balanced, and facility is thick – there
is a lower bound L = 32
(
min(γ ,κ)
η2
)
on how much demand or supply needs to be routed there. is
reduces the dynamic control problemwith atomic agents to a static problemwhere demand/supply
are fluid – exactly Two-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R) for suitable L that depends on η. Note that η is an
input parameter, so that L need not be a constant value.
6 ENVY-FREE PRICING AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
e idea of independently scaling up/down LP variables corresponding to individual facilities is
fairly general, and leads naturally to approximation algorithms for more complex variants that are
motivated by different scheduling policies for the dynamic marketplace problem. In this section,
we present one such formulation that generalizes the model discussed in Section 2. In section 6.2,
we show that this model corresponds to the seing when the platform uses prices to elicit patience
of agents, and uses Earliest Deadline First (EDF) scheduling in each facility.
We assume each node (type) j of buyer/seller has a collection of subtypes Sj . ere is a DAG
G j (Sj , E j ) on Sj that captures envy. If there is an edge (k1,k2) ∈ E j , then sub-type k1 envies sub-
type k2. e platform announces a price (resp. wage) pjk (resp. w jk ) for each sub-type k ∈ Sj . In
order to preserve incentive compatibility, we require that if (k1,k2) ∈ E j , then pjk1 ≤ pjk2 ; resp.
w jk1 ≥ w jk2 . is prevents an agent of sub-type k1 from reporting its type to be k2. Note that
since the graph G j is a DAG, such a price (resp. wage) assignment is feasible. We term such an
assignment of prices (resp. wages) at each j as a price (resp. wage) ladder.
As before, there is a non-increasing demand functiond jkFjk (pjk ) for each buyer sub-type k ∈ Sj ,
and a non-decreasing supply function sjkHjk (w jk ) for each seller sub-type k ∈ Sj . Each sub-type
k ∈ Sj is also associated with a weight Gjk . e platform learns which sub-type any agent chooses.
Lottery Pricing and Assignment. e platform opens a set of facilities. For each node j and
k ∈ Sj , buyers (resp. sellers) arriving at the node and choosing that type are probabilistically
routed to facilities which are within distance R from the node. We assume the platform shows a
loery over price (resp. wage) ladders as follows: For each node j ∈ V the platform maintains a
distribution Zj of facilities within distance bound R, and for each facility in this set, it maintains
a distribution Li j of price (resp. wage) ladders. Given an agent arriving at this node, the platform
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first chooses a facility i from Zj , and then a ladder from Li j and shows it to the agent. Aer the
agent chooses the price or wage (hence revealing its sub-type), she is routed to facility i . We note
that the routing policy makes the facility the agent is routed to be independent of the sub-type
elicited. ough this assumption is somewhat restrictive, it prevents the agent from choosing a
sub-type to optimize for the facility they get assigned to.
Service Availability Guarantee. As before, we capture service availability by ensuring that each
facility i has balanced supply and demand, and is also sufficiently thick. However, we now capture
thickness by a lower bound L on the total weight of the sub-types assigned there. Formally, let xi jk
denote the expected flow of sub-type k ∈ Sj to facility i .
Flow Balance. e expected amount of supply and demand assigned there are the same.
Weight Lower Bound. e expected weight assigned there is large:
∑
j∈V ,k ∈Sj Gjkxi jk ≥ L.
e objective is to maximize the expected profit of the solution. We term this problem Envy-
Free FL(L,R). We note that similar ideas can be used to maximize other objectives; we present the
profit objective for simplicity. In section 6.1, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1. ere is a polynomial time (4, 1) approximation for Envy-Free FL(L,R). at is, we
obtain the optimal expected profit by relaxing the distance constraint by a factor of 4.
In the dynamic marketplace seing presented in section 6.2, the sub-types correspond to differ-
ent deadlines, and the weight of a sub-type is precisely the deadline value. We show there that
the weight lower bound corresponds to the condition for the EDF scheduling policy to have low
abandonment rate.
6.1 Approximation Algorithm for Envy-Free FL(L,R)
Our LP formulation and rounding are similar to the one for Two-Sided Fac-Loc(L,R), and we
highlight the differences. As before, we assume there is a candidate set P and W of prices and
wages for each node, respectively. e set of all candidate facilities in the metric space is denoted
by F ; since we assume the metric space is explicitly specified as input, we set F = V . For each
node j , BR (j) ⊆ F denotes the set of all the facilities i ∈ F such that c(i, j) ≤ R. For each facility i ,
define BR (i) as the set of all the nodes j ∈ V such that c(i, j) ≤ R.
6.1.1 Linear Programming Relaxation. For each candidate facility i ∈ F , let yi ∈ {0, 1} be the
indicator variable that a facility exists at that location in the metric space. ese are the only
integer variables in our formulation. Variables xdi j and x
s
i j are non-zero only if yi = 1 and i ∈ BR (j).
In this case, those are respectively the probability that buyers and sellers at node j are routed
to facility i . Note that there is some probability that all prices at node j are set to pmax, which
corresponds to not routing node j anywhere. Let zi jkp be the probability that buyers at node j
with sub-type k ∈ Sj are assigned to facility i and offered price p. Similarly, zi jkw denotes the
probability that sellers at node j with sub-type k are assigned to facility i and offered wagew .
Objective and Constraints. e objective is the same as before.
max
∑
j∈V
∑
k ∈Sj
∑
i ∈BR (j)
©­«
∑
p ∈P
pd jkFjk (p)zi jkp −
∑
w ∈W
wsjkHjk (w)zi jkwª®¬ (16)
e following constraints connect the variables together. We present these constraints only for
buyers (that is, p ∈ P); the constraints for sellers is obtained by replacing p and xd with w ∈ W
and xs . Since we route the buyers at node j probabilistically to one of the facilities, or to no facility
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by offering all deadlines a price pmax: ∑
i ∈BR (j)
xdi j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ V (17)
Next, a price should be offered to each buyer with sub-type k at node j assigned to facility i :∑
p ∈P
zi jkp = x
d
i j ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j),k ∈ Sj (18)
Next, if demand is fractionally routed from j to i , then i should be open and within distance R:
xdi j ≤ yi ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j) (19)
We next enforce that the prices and wages form a distribution over ladders. Note that the policy
first chooses the facility to route to, and then chooses from a distribution over ladders. is reduces
to a stochastic dominance condition for the distributions corresponding to z:∑
p′≤p,p′∈P
zi jkp′ ≤
∑
p′≤p,p′∈P
zi jk′p′ ∀p ∈ P, (k,k ′) ∈ E j ,∀j ∈ V ,∀i ∈ BR (j) (20)∑
w ′≤w,w ′∈W
zi jkw ′ ≥
∑
w ′≤w,w ′∈W
zi jk′w ′ ∀w ∈ W, (k,k ′) ∈ E j ,∀j ∈ V ,∀i ∈ BR (j) (21)
Finally, we encode the service availability constraints. We first capture flow balance at each
facility: the rate of arrival of buyers and sellers are equal.∑
j∈BR (i )
∑
k ∈Sj ,p ∈P
d jkFjk (p)zi jkp =
∑
j∈BR (i )
∑
k ∈Sj ,w ∈W
sjkHjk (w)zi jkw ∀i ∈ F (22)
We finally encode weighted flow lower bound on the total deadline of buyers and sellers at the
facility:
∑
j∈BR (i )
∑
k ∈Sj
Gjk ©­«
∑
p ∈P
d jkFjk (p)zi jkp +
∑
w ∈W
sjkHjk (w)zi jkwª®¬ ≥ Lyi ∀i ∈ F (23)
6.1.2 Rounding. If we ignore the integrality constraints on yi , the above is a linear program-
ming relaxation of the problem. We will now show how to round the resulting solution.
We generalize Lemma 3.3 using the following definitions of fully utilized. We say that j ∈ V is
fully demand utilized if
∑
i ∈BR (j) x
d
i j = 1; similarly, it is fully supply-utilized if
∑
i ∈BR (j) x
s
i j = 1. We
say j is partially demand-connected to facility i ∈ F if xdi j > 0, and partially supply-connected if
xsi j > 0. Let JD (i) denote the set of nodes that are partially demand-connected to i ∈ F , and JS (i)
be the set that is partially supply-connected. As before, we define the profit of a facility i ∈ F as:
Ri =
∑
j∈BR (i )
∑
k ∈Sj
©­«
∑
p ∈P
pd jkFjk (p)zi jkp −
∑
w ∈W
wsjkHjk (w)zi jkwª®¬
Lemma 6.2. In the LP optimum, for any i ∈ F , Ri ≥ 0. Further, if Ri > 0, either yi = 1; or there
exists j ∈ JD (i), s.t. j is fully demand-utilized; or there exists j ∈ JS (i), s.t. j is fully supply-utilized.
e proof of the above lemma follows the same argument as Lemma 3.3: If a facility has neg-
ative Ri , we can set all its variables to zero without violating any constraints. If the condition
in the Lemma is violated for i ∈ F , then we can increase all variables corresponding to i by the
same factor till the condition is satisfied. Since all constraints involve single facilities, this process
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preserves them while increasing the objective. For this transformation to work, it is crucial Con-
straints (20) are defined separately for each (i, j) pair; in other words, we crucially need to assume
the policy chooses a facility first and then chooses a distribution over ladders for that facility.
e rounding now proceeds in the same way as in Section 2: In Phase 1, we identify untouched
and fully utilized j and merge all i to which it is partially connected to one facility. Note that the
total yi of these facilities is at least 1 by the LP constraints. At the end of this phase, we move the
remaining partially open i as in Phase 2 of the rounding scheme. is preserves the profit, and
satisfies the flow balance and lower bound constraints (BR is replaced by B4R in the constraints),
yielding the following theorem:
Theorem 6.3. ere is a feasible solution {x¯ , y¯, z¯} to the above linear program, whose objective is
optimal, and all of whose constraints are satisfied. For each i ∈ F , either y¯i = 0 or y¯i ≥ 1.
6.1.3 Final Policy. e final choice of prices and wages, and the routing policy is the following.
We present it only for buyers; the policy for sellers is symmetric.
• At node j , choose a facility i with probability x¯i j . If no facility is chosen, the price is set to
pmax.
• If facility i is chosen, choose α uniformly at random in [0, 1]. For each k ∈ Sj , find pk ∈ P
such that
∑
p′<pk ,p′∈P
z¯jkp′
x¯i j
≤ α and ∑p′≤pk ,p′∈P z¯jkp′x¯i j > α . Post prices {p1,p2, . . . ,pK }.
• If the buyer accepts price pk , route her to facility i .
Constraints (20) imply that regardless of the choice of α , the prices {p1,p2, . . . ,pK } in the second
step form a ladder, so that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pK . A similar statement holds for wages. erefore, the
second step produces a loery over ladders. Further, if Zi jkp denote the event that the price for
sub-type k ∈ Sj is p and facility i is chosen, then it is an easy exercise to check that E[Zi jkp ] = z¯jkp .
erefore, the randomized policy exactly implements the solution found in eorem 6.3, so that it
maximizes profit. Omiing details, this completes the proof of eorem 6.1.
6.2 Justification of Envy-Free FL via Dynamic Marketplace Model
In this section, we present a dynamic marketplace model that justifies the problem statement
of Envy-Free FL. As in Section 5, we assume buyers and sellers have an inherent patience level or
deadline. If they are not matched within their deadline, they drop out of the system. We assume
every agent m is associated with a patience level νm ; unlike Section 5, we do not assume these
are Exponentially distributed. e platform advertises a fixed set of patience levels, or deadlines,
denoted by Sj = {ν j1,ν j2, . . . ,ν jK }, which is a guarantee on the time by which a buyer or seller
choosing that deadline is guaranteed to be matched. We assume ν j1 ≤ ν j2 ≤ · · · ≤ ν jK . For
simplicity, we use k ∈ Sj and νk ∈ Sj interchangeably.
Incentive-compatibility.We assume the platform sets a loery of prices and wages at each node
j , that are independent of time. Consider the issue of eliciting deadlines truthfully. Consider buyers
first. At node j , suppose the platform offers price pjk for deadline ν jk . Every buyer can choose one
deadline in Sj , in which case he pays price pjk , and is guaranteed to be matched within time ν jk
from his arrival. We assume any buyerm has very large negative utility for being matched aer
his patience level νm , therefore he will choose a k such that ν jk ≤ νm . Subject to this, he will
choose k with smallest pjk , since this maximizes his valuation minus price. A symmetric model
can be posited for sellers, where we replace price with wage, and the seller chooses the largest
wage such that the corresponding deadline is smaller than his own patience level.
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Since the goal of the platform is to elicit patience levels truthfully, the platform chooses a price
ladder pj1 ≥ pj2 ≥ · · · ≥ pjK and wage ladder w j1 ≤ w j2 ≤ · · · ≤ w jK at each node j . is ensures
that agents with νm ∈ [ν jk ,ν jk+1] report deadline ν jk .
Each deadline level ν jk ∈ Sj gets associated with non-increasing demand function d jkFjk (pjk ),
which is the Poisson rate at which buyersm with patience νm ∈ [ν jk ,ν jk+1] arrive when the price
of deadline ν jk is pjk . Similarly, deadline level k ∈ Sj is associated with a non-decreasing supply
function sjkHjk (w jk ), which is the Poisson rate at which sellersm with patience νm ∈ [ν jk ,ν jk+1]
arrive when the wage for deadline ν jk is w jk . ese deadline levels correspond to the sub-types
described before.
Scheduling Policy. As in Section 5, the platform opens a set of facilities. For each node j and
deadline level k , buyers (resp. sellers) arriving at the node and choosing that deadline are prob-
abilistically routed to facilities which are within distance R from the node. Buyers and sellers
arriving at the facility are queued up, and optimally matched to minimize abandonment. Since the
platform knows which deadline was chosen by the agent, the optimal matching policy is now a
variant of Earliest Deadline First (EDF): When the deadline of some buyer (resp. seller) expires, it is
matched to that seller (resp. buyer) in the queue whose deadline will expire earliest in the future.
If an agent’s deadline expires and there is no agent to match it with in the queue, this agent is
abandoned. It is an easy exercise to show that this policy maximizes the number of matches made
in any facility.
As in Section 5, the goal of the platform is to design a joint pricing and scheduling policy to
maximize profit, while ensuring bounded match distance and bounded abandonment probability.
6.2.1 Bounding Abandonment Rate. We will now show that the weight lower bound can be
interpreted as a sufficient condition for the abandonment rate of the EDF policy to be at most η,
where the weight of a sub-type is simply its deadline value.
emain technical assumption we require in this part is that the desired abandonment probabil-
ity, η is small, in particular that η ≪ νminνmax . As noted above, the scheduling policy within a facility is
a variant of EDF. Unlike the Patience-obliviousmodel where the behavior of a facility could be
modeled as a variant of aM/M/1 queue, the optimal abandonment probability in a two-sided EDF
queue clearly depends on the entire distribution of deadlines of buyers and sellers, which in turn
depends on the pricing scheme and assignment policy. However, we crucially need a closed-form
bound on this probability in order to plug into an LP relaxation for the overall problem. We use
recent results from queueing due to Kruk et al. [Kruk et al., 2011] to construct such a closed-form
bound, whose very existence we find non-trivial and surprising!
Kruk et al. [Kruk et al., 2011] present an approximation to the abandonment probability of a
one-sided queueM/M/1 queue with EDF scheduling. ey approximate the queueing process via
a reflected Brownian motion. We adapt their result to our seing, and rephrase it below. Consider
the queue associated with a facility. Let S¯ denote the average deadline of a seller arriving to this
queue, and D¯ denote the average deadline of a buyer arriving to the queue. Note that the distribu-
tion of deadlines and the arrival rate depends on the overall pricing and assignment policies.
Recall that we assumed η is small, in particular that η ≪ νmin
νmax
. We first enforce that supply and
demand arrive to the queue at the same rate; call this rate λ. Next suppose w.l.o.g. that D¯ > S¯ .
Consider the policy that instantaneously matches arriving sellers to the queued buyer with earliest
deadline; if the queue is empty, the seller is abandoned. is exactly mimics a one-sided M/M/1
queue with EDF scheduling. We quote the following result informally from [Kruk et al., 2011]:
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Consider a one sided M/M/1 queue with arrival rate and service rate equal to
λ. Suppose deadlines of jobs are independently distributed with mean D¯, and the
scheduler uses the EDF policy. en holding λ and νmaxνmin fixed, in the regime where
νmin becomes very large, the abandonment probability approaches
1
λD¯
.
ough part of their argument is heuristic, they perform simulations to show that this approxi-
mation is indeed accurate. Since we need abandonment probability of 1
λD¯
to be at most η ≪ 1, and
since we assumed νmin
νmax
≫ η, this automatically enforces that all deadlines are much larger than
the mean inter-arrival time, satisfying their precondition for our seing.
Since the optimal policy for a two-sided queue only has lower abandonment probability, we use
1
λD¯
as an upper bound on this quantity. Since we assumed D¯ ≥ S¯ , we will instead use 2
λ(D¯+S¯ ) as
the upper bound, which we will set to be at most η.
We now show that this is the best possible upper bound that only depends on D¯ and S¯ . Suppose
buyers deadlines are deterministic with value D¯ , and seller deadlines are deterministic with value S¯ .
en the optimal policymatcheswithout waiting in a FIFO fashion. is means the loss probability
assuming the queue has buyers is the same as that of a M/M/1 queue with deadlines D¯, which
from [Boots and Tijms, 1999] is exactly
P1 =
1
1 + λD¯
Similarly, when there are sellers in the queue, the loss probability is
P2 =
1
1 + λS¯
Conditioned on the queue being empty and a buyer arriving, the expected time aer which the
queue next becomes empty isTb =
1
P1
= 1+λD¯, in which period the loss probability is P1. Similarly,
if a seller arrives when the queue is empty, the expected time aer which the queue again becomes
empty isTs =
1
P2
= 1+λD¯, in which period the loss probability is P2. Since a buyer or seller arrives
with equal probability when a queue is empty, the expected loss probability is
P =
TbP1 +TsP2
Tb +Ts
=
2
2 + λD¯ + λS¯
≈ 2
λ
(
D¯ + S¯
)
assuming λ(D¯ + S¯) ≫ 1.
In summary, each facility needs to satisfy the following two sufficient conditions for its aban-
donment probability to be at most η:
(1) e rate of arrival of supply and demand should be the same; call this rate λ.
(2) If S¯ denote the average deadline of a seller, and D¯ denote the average deadline of a buyer,
then λ(D¯ + S¯) ≥ 2
η
.
erefore, to reduce the scheduling policy to an instance of Envy-Free FL(R, L), we setGjk = ν jk
and L = 2
η
, so that the second condition above translates to the weight lower bound. is justi-
fies the Envy-Free FL(R, L) problem as capturing the optimal scheduling policy for the dynamic
marketplace problem presented above.
Note that the resulting lower bound on λ derived by the above condition is a significant improve-
ment over the patience-oblivious case, since the lower bound now depends on 1
η
instead of 1
η2
. is
intuitively means that in order to achieve comparable profit and abandonment probability, we can
aim for a higher quality of match by reducing the radius R. A similar observation that even par-
tial information about deadlines significantly reduces abandonment is made in [Akbarpour et al.,
2014], albeit for a different model.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
Our work is a first step in understanding the problem of jointly pricing and scheduling in dy-
namic matching markets. We showed that a natural sub-class of two-sided stochastic matching
policies can be reduced to novel variants of facility location, yielding approximation algorithms
for the joint pricing and scheduling problem in two-sided markets.
We now mention several open questions that arise. For the facility location problems, there
are other variants that we do not yet have good algorithms for. For instance, our model imposes
a uniform distance bound the match of any agent. Extending it to average match distance will
require new techniques; the basic filtering step in facility location rounding fails in our case since
the demand value itself is a variable. It is also an interesting question to extend our techniques
to when markets can be priced, and agents choose markets to optimize their utility, extending
techniques for stochastic scheduling in one-sided markets [Chawla et al., 2017a,b].
For the dynamic marketplace problems, we reduced a special type of scheduling policy to the
facility location problems. One can ask: What about approximating the overall optimal policy? Such
a policy need not use facilities, and is poorly understood even when pricing is not involved (for
instance, see [Akbarpour et al., 2014]).
Our model here also assumed Poisson arrivals whose rate is constant over time. A different ap-
proach is to use online algorithms. In particular, it would be interesting to incorporate pricing and
wages into the “online matching with delays” models considered in [Azar et al., 2017, Emek et al.,
2016]. For instance, if we ignore pricing, and assume agents simply reveal their deadlines, a nat-
ural objective is to minimize the sum of metric distances traveled by agents for their match plus
the weighted number of agents whose deadlines are missed. For this problem, the techniques
in [Azar et al., 2017, Emek et al., 2016] do not seem to extend. An interesting question is whether
a polylogarithmic competitive ratio algorithm exists for this variant.
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A OMITTED PROOFS AND EXAMPLES
A.1 Integrality Gap Example in Section 2
First, we show that the optimum solution can open a facility with negative profit. To be more
specific, for any given constant c < 1 we present a simple example in which c fraction of the total
surplus is generated by a facility with negative profit. en we use this example to show that the
LP has unbounded integrality gap.
Let V = F = {v,v ′} such that c(v,v ′) = ∞, and L be the lower bound for the total amount of
demand (supply) at each open facility. For node v , assume dv = sv = L, the valuation of buyers
is uniformly distributed over the interval [2, 3], and the cost of sellers is uniformly distributed
over the interval [0, 1]. For node v ′, assume dv ′ = sv ′ = L, the valuation of buyers is uniformly
distributed over the interval [c ′ − 1, 2c ′ + 1], and the cost of sellers is uniformly distributed over
the interval [0, c ′]where c ′ = 2c1−c . We claim that the optimum integral solution for this example is
to open a facility at each of the nodes and set the price and wage at node v to 2 and 1 respectively,
and set the price and wage at node v ′ to c ′ − 1 and c ′ respectively.
First, we show that this solution is feasible. At each node the price is notmore than the valuation
of any arriving buyer. erefore, all the buyers choose to participate. Similarly, since the wage
is not less than the cost of any arriving seller, all the sellers choose to participate. is solution
satisfies flow balance for each of the facilities because the volume of sellers and buyers are equal
at the corresponding node, and all of them choose to participate. In addition, flow lower bound is
also satisfied. Finally, the profit of the facility at v is dv and the loss of the facility at node v
′ is dv ′ .
erefore, the total profit is 0 and profit of the facility at node v compensates for the loss at the
other facility.
Now, we show that the surplus of the facility with negative profit is a fraction c of the total
surplus. e surplus at node v is dv × (2.5 − 0.5) = 2L and the surplus at node v ′ is dv ′ × (3c ′/2 −
c ′/2) = c ′L. erefore, c ′/(c ′ + 2) = c fraction of the surplus is generated at node v ′.
Finally, we need to show that this solution is optimum. e nodes are far from each other and
we cannot send the buyers and sellers from different nodes to a common facility. e only option
for opening a facility at each of the nodes is to set the price and wage at each node in a way that
all the arriving buyers and sellers choose to participate (otherwise, the flow lower bound cannot
be satisfied). erefore, this problem has three feasible integral solutions: no facility is opened, a
facility at node v is opened, and a facility at each of the nodes is opened. Note that the solution
which only opens a facility at v ′ is not feasible because it does not satisfy weak budget balance.
e surplus of those solutions are 0, 2L, and (2 + c ′)L respectively. erefore, the third solution
is optimum. Also it is easy to see that this integer optimum solution is also LP optimum solution.
e reason is that both facilities generate positive surplus and partially opening any facility by
fractionally assigning that node as an outlier results in lower surplus.
Integrality Gap. Now we slightly modify the previous example to show that the LP has un-
bounded integrality gap. We only change the distribution of the valuation of the buyers at nodev ′.
e valuation of the buyers is now uniformly distributed over the interval [c ′ − 1 − ϵ, 2c ′ + 1 + ϵ]
for a small positive constant ϵ . Aer this change, the integral solution which opens a facility at
each node is not feasible anymore because it violates weak budget balance constraint. erefore,
the optimum integral solution has 2L surplus.
On the other hand we claim that there is a fractional solution which has ( 11+ϵ × 2c1−c +2)L surplus.
Set the price and wage at node v to 2 and 1 and open the facility at that node (yv = 1). For the
node v ′ we can only open the facility partially. Set yv ′ = 11+ϵ and the price and wage at node
v ′ to c ′ − 1 − ϵ and c ′ with probability 11+ϵ and to pmax and 0 with probability ϵ1+ϵ . In other
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words, set αv ′1 = βv ′1 =
1
1+ϵ and αv ′0 = βv ′0 =
ϵ
1+ϵ . is solution is feasible and generates
( 11+ϵ × 2c1−c + 2)L surplus, while the optimum integer solution generates only 2L surplus. Note that
c can be arbitrarily close to 1 and therefore the integrality gap is unbounded.
A.2 Solving the LP Formulation in Section 2
We now show how to use the Ellipsoid algorithm to efficiently solve the LP formulation in
Section 2 to arbitrary additive accuracy even when the demand and supply distributions are con-
tinuous, so that the sets Qj (resp. Rj ) are continuous. First we get rid of weak budget balance by
take a Lagrangian of surplus and the profit. For any parameter λ ≥ 0, define:
Vλj (q) = Vj (q) + λd jqF−1j (q)
and
Cλj (r ) = Cj (r ) + λsjrH−1j (r )
Since we assumed regular supply and demand distributions, it is easy to show that Vλj (q) is
concave in q and Cλj (r ) is convex in r . e Lagrangian objective is then:
Maximize
∑
j∈V
©­«
∑
q∈Qj
∑
i ∈BR (j)
zi jqVλj (q) −
∑
r ∈Rj
∑
i ∈BR (j)
zi jrCλj (r )ª®¬∑
q∈Qj
∑
i ∈F zi jq ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ V∑
r ∈Rj
∑
i ∈F zi jr ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ V∑
q∈Qj zi jq ≤ yi ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j)∑
q∈Rj zi jr ≤ yi ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j)∑
j∈BR (i ) d j
∑
q∈Qj qzi jq =
∑
j∈BR (i ) sj
∑
r ∈Rj rzi jr ∀i ∈ F∑
j∈BR (i ) d j
∑
q∈Qj qzi jq ≥ Lyi ∀i ∈ F
zi jq , zi jr ,yi ≥ 0 ∀i, j,q, r
e dual is the following:
Minimize
∑
j∈V
(aj + bj )
aj + ηi j + d jq(ζi − ρi ) ≥ Vλj (q) ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j),q ∈ Qj
bj + θi j − sjrζi + Cλj (r ) ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j), r ∈ Rj
Lρi ≥ ηi j + θi j ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j)
ηi j , θi j , ρi ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ V , i ∈ BR (j)
For fixed dual variables, sinceVλj (q) is concave in q and Cλj (r ) is convex in r , it is easy to check
that for each i, j , the separation oracle either involves maximizing a concave function in q (for the
first set of constraints) or minimizing a convex function in r (for the second set of constraints).
In either case, finding the separating hyperplane involves one-dimensional convex optimization.
is implies the LP admits to an efficient additive approximation even for continuous distributions
over a bounded domain. We omit the standard details.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1: Necessary Condition
For the necessary conditions, the first condition is obvious: If λ/µ < [1−η, 1+η], in steady state,
a fraction η of either buyers or sellers must necessarily be discarded just because an equal number
of buyers and sellers are matched.
Next, we show that if λ = µ , the bound on q0 in Equation (15) is tight to a constant factor. Recall
we define c = min(γ ,κ)/λ. First, note that if c ≥ 1, we have
1
q0
≤ 2
∞∑
n=0
(
n∏
j=0
1
(1 + jc)
)
≤ 2
∞∑
n=0
(
1
(n + 1)!
)
= 2 · (e − 1)
is gives q0 ≥ 0.29 which is infeasible as we want η ≤ 1/6. us, the only relevant case is
c = min(κ,γ )/λ ≤ 1, for which we have:
1
q0
≤ 2
∞∑
n=0
(
n∏
j=0
1
(1 + jc)
)
≤ 2 ©­«
1/√c−1∑
n=0
1 +
∞∑
n=1/√c
©­«
1/√c∏
j=1
1
(1 + jc)
ª®¬
(
1
1 +
√
c
)n−1/√cª®¬
≤ 2
(
1√
c
+ 2
− c2
(
1√
c
)2 ∞∑
i=0
(
1
1 +
√
c
)i )
(Since 1/(1 + x) ≤ 2−x for x ∈ [0, 1])
≤ 2
(
1√
c
+
1√
2
· 1 +
√
c√
c
)
≤ 7√
c
Next suppose λ > µ; note that this means λ ∈ µ · [1, 1+η] since λ/µ ∈ [1−η, 1+η]. Now consider
the subset of the Markov chain on the states {0,b(1),b(2), . . .}, with transition rates from b(n) to
b(n − 1) is µ + nκ, and that from b(n − 1) to b(n) is λ > µ; we henceforth refer to this as the buyer
system. Note that the abandonment rate of buyers in this system is stochastically dominated by
the abandonment rate if µ = λ.
Now, conditioned on the queue being empty and a buyer (resp. seller) arriving, let Tb (resp.
Ts ) denote the expected time aer which the queue next becomes empty, and let Rb (resp. Rs )
denote the abandonment rates in these periods. When the queue is empty, the probability that a
buyer arrives is λλ+µ ∈
[
1
2 ,
7
13
]
, since η ≤ 1/6. Moreover, Wald’s identity gives that the overall
abandonment rate is by R
(
λ
λ+µ
Tb +
µ
λ+µ
Ts
)
=
(
λ
λ+µ
RbTb +
µ
λ+µ
RsTs
)
, and thus
R ≥ µ
λ
(
TbRb +TsRs
Tb +Ts
)
≥ 6
7
× Rb × Tb
Tb +Ts
Now we need to consider two separate cases:
(1) γ > κ: Here, the transition rate from s(n) to s(n− 1) is λ+nγ , and that transition rate from
b(n) to b(n − 1) is µ +nκ < λ +nγ ; on the other hand, the rate from s(n − 1) to s(n) is µ and
that from b(n − 1) to b(n) is λ > µ . By stochastic dominance, we therefore have Ts ≤ Tb ,
which means the abandonment rate is:
R ≥ 6
7
× Rb × Tb
Tb +Ts
≥ 3
7
Rb
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Moreover the abandonment probability in the buyer system is smaller if we assume λ = µ ,
and hence Rbλ ≥ 17
√
κ
λ . Combining these bounds ,we have:
R ≥ 3
7
Rb ≥ 3
49
√
κλ
Since the overall arrival rate is at most 2λ, the abandonment probability is at least 133
√
κ
λ
.
(2) γ ≤ κ: In this case, note thatTb is the inverse of the probability the buyer system is in state
b(0). Since this probability is maximized when λ = µ , we have Tb ≥
(√
3µ
2κ
)
. Similarly, Ts
is maximized when λ = µ , so that Ts ≤ 7
√
λ
γ
. erefore, assuming η ≤ 1/6, we have:
Ts
Tb
≤
(
7
√
2√
3
√
κ
γ
)
≤ 6
√
κ
γ
⇒ Tb
Ts +Tb
≥ 1
1 + 6
√
κ/γ
≥ 1
7
√
γ
κ
Further, as before, the abandonment rate Rb ≥ 17
√
λκ, and thus
R ≥ 6
7
× 1
7
√
λκ × 1
7
√
γ
κ
=
6
343
√
λγ
is means the abandonment probability is at least 3343
√
γ
λ
.
Combining the two, we see that to guarantee that in order to ensure average abandonment rate is
at most η, we need λ ≥ 114000 min(γ ,κ)/η2.
